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THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN AN
INTERNATIONALIZED MARKETPLACE
JAMES R. DOTY*
Mr. Doty, General Counsel of the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC"), explores the complexities of an internationalized securities
market and the appropriate role of the SEC in such a marketplace. Mr. Doty
examines the cooperation of securities authorities from around the globe includ-
ing the SEC, to address problems offraudulent conduct, capital adequacy, and
standards of disclosure Mr. Doty concludes that the SEC has been, and should
continue to be, a "'standard-setter" in the globalization process.
".. . to produce nothing wholly new and retain nothing wholly
obsolete."
- A.M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 26 (1975)
(paraphrasing Edmund Burke).
INTRODUCTION
C ONSIDERING the role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC" or "Commission") over a nearly sixty-year history,'
one is struck by the extent to which the very business of the Commission
consists of the explanation of the standards imposed by its statutes, the
justification of its actions by reference to those statutory standards, and
the refinement of its means of seeking to advance those standards. The
briefs filed, the opinions issued, the releases proposing and adopting
rulemaking-all have as their purpose the articulation of standards of
* Rice University, B.A., 1962; Oxford University, A.B., 1964; Yale Law School,
J.D., 1969. Mr. Doty is General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Susan Nash, Senior Counsel, Of-
fice of the General Counsel of the Commission, in researching and writing this article.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibil-
ity for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission
or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
This article is based on an address delivered by Mr. Doty on February 6, 1992, as part
of the Fordhain University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1991-1992, Financial
Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s.
1. The Commission was established pursuant to Section 4 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988). The Commission is responsi-
ble not only for administering the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 7811 (1988), but also
the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1988); the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1988); the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1988); the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1988); and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1988). For a general discussion of the statutes administered
by the Commission, see I L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 226-77 (3d ed.
1989).
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commercial conduct and the study of the appropriate regulatory means
to achieve those standards. The focus on standards and means appears
particularly relevant as the Commission faces the complexities of an in-
ternationalized securities marketplace.
It has not escaped the notice of the Commission's staff that today's
markets are vastly different from the markets regulated by the first Com-
mission in the 1930s.2 Markets in the United States no longer exist sepa-
rate and apart from markets throughout the world. Instead, our markets
are closely linked to markets in other nations. Events in our markets
affect, and are affected by, events in other nations' markets.
This internationalization of the securities markets has been occurring
for some time, but its pace in the last several years has been especially
dramatic. The trend toward internationalization is now evident in the
news that greets us daily-the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe
have expressed their preference for free markets over controlled econo-
mies; BCCI has demonstrated how a financial scandal can assume global
dimensions. As the United States is engaged in trade negotiations over
financial services with Canada and Mexico, the European Community is
moving toward a unified market and the Uruguay Round of talks under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade enters a possibly critical
phase. In each case, these negotiations will significantly affect the future
of our domestic financial services industry.
Notwithstanding the pace and magnitude of these events, it is apparent
that some of the basic assumptions of the United States system of securi-
ties regulation have stood the test of time. Commentators in other na-
tions are expressing the view that the Commission is a structural model
for combining enforcement effectiveness with capacity for change.' As is
often the case when institutions are being reshaped to deal with the
forces of economic change, it is essential to ask again the question:
"What should be retained?"
The Commission was created by Congress to help ensure that United
States markets are fair and efficient and that United States investors are
treated fairly. That original Congressional mandate remains in place.
Fraud and manipulation, described by Professor Louis Loss as
2. See generally Staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce Concerning Internationalization of the Securities Markets (1987).
3. The editors of the Economist have been especially forthright about the appeal of
the U.S. model:
Britain has married legal complexity to conflict of interest. It is time to seek
virtue elsewhere-in statutory rule by a single, independent body. Britain needs
the equivalent of America's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
... When necessary, the SEC can operate informally in the old London style;
few would ignore a call from the SEC's head of enforcement, audibly waggling
his eyebrows. Yet the commission's rules are clear, and vigorously applied.
An SECfor London, Economist, Mar. 7, 1992, at 20.
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"problems [that] are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of
buyers,"' transcend national borders. Nations, however, have not always
agreed on what should be done about fraud and manipulation. United
States investors have found that United States standards of commercial
conduct do not always apply in other markets.
The issues confronted by the Commission in an era of internationaliza-
tion exhibit a complexity that they did not have when our markets were
more insular. In order to regulate domestic markets and protect United
States investors, today's Commission must be concerned with, among
other things, (i) the effects on domestic markets and United States inves-
tors of actions taken abroad by private parties and foreign regulators;
(ii) the international ramifications of the Commission's actions; and
(iii) how those international ramifications, in turn, will feed back into or
otherwise affect domestic markets and United States investors.
The standards of conduct applied by the Commission have become
matters of significant international, as well as domestic, policy. Not sur-
prisingly, they can become matters of controversy.
This Article addresses three international areas in which the sharp fo-
cus on standards is of particular, current importance for the Commission
and for the future of our securities markets. Part I of the Article ad-
dresses the matter of the transparency-or opacity--of the market, and
the related matter of the willingness-or reluctance-of law enforcement
officials to cooperate to foster transparency and to address fraudulent or
manipulative conduct. Part II discusses the fact that the stability of our
linked markets may well depend on the capital adequacy of market par-
ticipants, and upon some consensus among regulators with respect to
capital standards. Part III discusses the standard of disclosure to the
marketplace required of issuers seeking to raise capital in our markets-a
standard that continues to be of major concern. Finally, the Article con-
cludes that the Commission's standards have contributed to the strength
of the United States markets and that the Commission's role in the
globalization process has been that of a "standard-setter."
I. TRANSPARENCY AND ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION
A. Transparency versus Secrecy
"Transparency," in its most technical sense, is the degree to which
real-time trade and quotation information are available to market partici-
pants. Transparency is important to fair and efficient markets for a vari-
ety of reasons. By providing market participants with current market
data, transparency helps participants assess the value of securities in or-
4. 1 L. Loss & J. Seligman, supra note 1, at 3. See generally S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (outlining abuses that led to enactment of Exchange Act); I L
Loss & J. Seligman, supra note 1, at 3-28 (discussion of abuses leading to enactment of
federal securities laws); J. Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 1-100 (1982)
(description of events leading to creation of Commission).
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der to make informed investment decisions. Transparency eliminates a
situation where "insiders" enter into transactions on the basis of current
market data, leaving the public to invest on the basis of stale information.
As a generally prevailing principle, therefore, transparency enhances
market integrity and investor confidence. Transparency enables inves-
tors to determine whether they are charged fair prices by their brokers,
or whether they are charged excessive markups or markdowns. The
availability of quotation and transaction information also enables market
participants to assist regulators in detecting insider trading and manipu-
lation. Transparency also promotes competition among markets and
market makers, contributing to more efficient pricing.5
The Commission supports transparency of securities markets,6 but this
stance is not universally shared around the globe. One of the major de-
bates regarding world markets today is over the appropriate level of
transparency.7 Indeed, transparency has evidently been one of the stum-
bling blocks to agreement by the European Community on an Invest-
ment Services Directive, with members of the "Club Med Alliance"
(France, Italy, and Spain) advocating complete transparency and mem-
bers of the "Liberal Alliance" (United Kingdom, Germany, and the
Netherlands) supporting next-day reporting for many trades.'
Transparency has recently raised broader issues for the Commission,
involving both domestic and international concerns. At the same time
that debates continue over transparency in other countries' markets, pro-
gress remains to be made with respect to transparency in the United
States. Information released in the summer of 1991 by Salomon Brothers
concerning its bidding in the market for United States government secur-
5. See Richard C. Breeden, Testimony on Behalf of the Commission Concerning
The Government Securities Market, Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives 102d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 9-11 (Oct. 25, 1991); Department of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange
Commission, & Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Joint Report on the
Government Securities Market B-87 (1992); The Division of Market Regulation of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Automated Securities Trading: A Discussion
of Selected Critical Issues, at 10-12 (199 1)(prepared for the IOSCO 1991 Annual Meeting
Panel on Automated Trading, Washington, D.C.).
6. See, e.g., Richard C. Breeden, Testimony on Behalf of the Commission Concern-
ing The Commission's Authorization Request for Fiscal Years 1992-1994, Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S.
House of Representatives 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (May 2, 1991).
7. See The Division of Market Regulation, supra note 5, at 10-17; J.R. Hardiman,
Automation and Electronic Trading: Key Issues for Regulating in a New Era, at 4-5 (Sept.
26, 1991)(presented at the IOSCO 1991 Annual Conference, Washington, D.C.); Franks
& Schaefer, Equity Market Transparency, Stock Exchange Q., Apr.-June 1991, at 7;
Trade Publication and Price Transparency on the International Stock Exchange, A Re-
port by the Director General of Fair Trading to the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry (Apr. 1990).
8. See Heyman, Regulation of International Securities Markets: The Perspective of
the Division of Market Regulation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Business Experience and
Regulatory Policy 86-87 (Sept. 23, 1991).
S80 [Vol. 60
SEC'S ROLE
ities has focused public attention on disclosure and trading practices in
that market.9
In the dialogue over transparency, it will be suggested that users' appe-
tite for transparency is insatiable and that it is impossible to know when
the desirable degree of transparency has been achieved. Although trans-
parency may in fact be a matter of degree, it cannot be seriously argued
that the optimal degree has been achieved. This is an area where the
United States leads by example; and its investors, who increasingly
launch into new and distant markets, have a real interest in our continu-
ing to press for higher standards.
B. Insider Trading and Enforcement Cooperation
Just as transparency depends on the timely delivery of information to
the market, the fairness and integrity of the market also require an en-
forcement response when individuals attempt to take advantage of opac-
ity or engage in other fraudulent practices. Just as there are differences
of international opinion about transparency, there are also divergent
views among nations about enforcement response.
The internationalized marketplace has created new opportunities for
fraud to cross national boundaries, limited only by the creativity of its
perpetrators. Fraud can be perpetrated from within one country upon
investors in another country."0 Readers of James B. Stewart's Den of
Thieves11 will appreciate that fraud can be perpetrated from within one
country upon investors of that country, using bank accounts or corporate
entities in a second country to evade detection. 2 Or the perpetrators of
fraud in one country can transfer their assets to another jurisdiction,
thereby rendering a judgment difficult to enforce.I3 Despite these diffi-
culties posed by globalization of the marketplace, the Commission is
committed to protecting United States investors and safeguarding the in-
tegrity of United States markets. For this purpose, the Commission em-
ploys means of law enforcement that are available both domestically and
through international cooperation. 14
9. See Dept. of the Treasury, Securities and Exchange Commission, & Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 5, at C-I to C-7 (description of
events involving Salomon Brothers). Although the U.S. equity markets overall have
achieved a high degree of transparency, improvements in the transparency of the govern-
ment securities markets have become a matter of Congressional interest.
10. See eg., SEC v. International Swiss Inv. Corp., Litigation Release No. 11704
(Apr. 15, 1988), 40 SEC Docket 1286 (boiler room operated in Latin American countries
to sell securities to U.S. investors).
11. J.B. Stewart, Den of Thieves (1991).
12. See e.g., SEC v. Levine, Litigation Release No. 11095 (May 12, 1986). 35 SEC
Docket 1212 (May 12, 1986) (insider trading by investment banker in New York City
conducted through accounts in the names of Panamanian corporations located at the
Bahamian branch of a foreign financial institution).
13. See id.
14. For a discussion of international enforcement issues, see Mann & Lustgarten, In-
ternationalization of Insider Trading Enforcement-A Guide to Regulation and Coopera-
1992]
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Judicial decisions in the United States have established that the Com-
mission may bring enforcement actions with respect to transactions that
have extraterritorial aspects, provided that either an "effects" test or a
"conduct" test is satisfied. 5 These tests together provide a view of juris-
diction under the federal securities laws that is crucial to the Commis-
sion's ability to bring enforcement actions to protect United States
markets and United States investors.
The Commission's enforcement program can be effective only if the
actions it brings result in enforceable judgments. One mechanism that
the Commission employs in order to obtain enforceable judgments is the
asset freeze. 6 Deterrence of fraudulent activities by the Commission de-
pends, in significant part, on the ability to render those activities unprof-
itable. The federal securities laws and the courts provide the
Commission with various remedies that can render fraudulent activity
unprofitable, including disgorgement 7 and civil penalties. 8 The asset
freeze, in turn, makes it possible for the Commission to collect monetary
judgments, by assuring that the frozen funds will not be removed from
the jurisdiction of the United States courts.
Notwithstanding the extraterritorial application of the federal securi-
ties laws by United States courts and the availability of enforcement tools
tion, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Business
Experience and Regulatory Policy 73 (1991); McLucas, DeTore, & Fountain, Protecting
Investors from International Fraud-Legal and Enforcement Developments (presented at
the IOSCO 1991 Annual Conference, Washington, D.C.); Doty, Developments in Interna-
tional Securities Law Litigation and Technical Assistance to Emerging Securities Markets,
ALI-ABA Course of Study, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Business Ex-
perience and Regulatory Policy 125 (1991).
15. See Doty, supra note 14, at 130-39.
For cases construing the "effects" test, see Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), as modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939
(1989); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
For cases construing the "conduct" test, see IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1980); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,
Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Certain Purchasers of Common Stock and Call Option Contracts
for the Common Stock of Contel Corp., Litigation Release No. 12542 (July 13, 1990), 46
SEC Docket 1395; SEC v. Fondation Hai, Litigation Release No. 12353 (Jan. 18, 1990),
45 SEC Docket 714; SEC v. Finacor Anstalt, Litigation Release No. 12296 (Nov. 20,
1989), 44 SEC Docket 2231; SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers in the Common Stock
of, and Call Options for the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l, Litigation Release No.
9484 (Oct. 26, 1981), 23 SEC Docket 1378; SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, Litiga-
tion Release No. 9334 (Apr. 3, 1981), 22 SEC Docket 749. See generally McLucas,
DeTore & Fountain, supra note 14, at 22-25.
17. See, eg., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).




such as the asset freeze, the Commission has placed increasing emphasis
on international cooperation. Because fraud has become a global prob-
lem, global solutions are required.
International cooperation in securities law enforcement becomes possi-
ble when countries share common concepts about the nature of activities
that are fraudulent and that therefore should be prohibited. Absent
agreement on wrongful conduct, countries have often been reluctant to
cooperate on enforcement matters.
It can be a difficult matter for countries to agree on even the most
fundamental principles of securities law regulation, but, as the example
of insider trading demonstrates, agreement is possible. The United States
and the Commission have been world leaders in outlawing and prosecut-
ing insider trading. In recent years, and in significant part due to the
example set by the United States and the Commission, a number of other
nations have enacted insider trading prohibitions or have strengthened
those already in place. These nations include Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, Japan, France, and The Netherlands. 9 In addition, all of the
European Community members are committed to prohibiting insider
trading by June 1, 1992.20 The extent to which United States standards
of conduct for corporate insiders have influenced other cultures was viv-
idly illustrated recently when a major German bank terminated an em-
ployee following allegations of insider trading.2 For a nation that in the
past has not prohibited insider trading by law,' this event reveals an
extraordinary cultural change in process. While insider trading laws
vary from country to country, it is significant that some form of prohibi-
tion on insider trading is becoming widely accepted.
One of the greatest difficulties of investigating illegal cross-border con-
duct is gathering evidence. Accordingly, international cooperation in en-
forcement investigations is crucial to successful prosecution of such
fraudulent activities. Commission efforts to obtain evidence from abroad
can involve the expenditure of substantial time and resources, and, par-
ticularly where blocking or secrecy laws are involved, may be unwelcome
by governmental authorities in other countries. For these reasons, the
Commission has embarked on a highly successful program of negotiating
bilateral memoranda of understanding ("MOUs") that facilitate the ex-
change of information. 3 The Commission has entered into more than
ten MOUs and other enforcement cooperation understandings, " and is
19. See generally Mann & Lustgarten, supra note 14, at 107-22.
20. See Directive No. 89/592, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 1989
0.1. (L 334) 30, reprinted in I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1761.
21. See German Insider Trading" Behind the Times, Economist, July 13, 1991, at 86.
22. See Stock Trading Without Borders, Fortune, Dec. 2, 1991, at 158 (German legis-
lature considering law prohibiting insider trading).
23. See generally Mann & Lustgarten, supra note 14, at 99-106; McLucas, DeTore, &
Fountain, supra note 14, at 27-30.
24. See International Series Release No. 2 (Aug. 31, 1982), 43 SEC Docket 141 (Swit-
zerland); International Series Release No. 5 (May 23, 1986), 43 SEC Docket 184 (Japan);
1992]
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engaged in negotiating additional enforcement understandings.
The implementation of international information-sharing agreements
can raise difficult issues, such as the authority of one country's regulators
to provide assistance and the degree of confidentiality that can be granted
by the recipient country to information received. The Commission, how-
ever, has worked to resolve those problems when they arise-for exam-
ple, by seeking the enactment of legislation expressly authorizing the
Commission to conduct investigations of violations of foreign law,25 ex-
empting from the Freedom of Information Act certain records obtained
by the Commission from foreign regulators,26 and granting the Commis-
sion rulemaking authority to provide information to foreign authorities
upon receipt of appropriate assurances of confidentiality.27 The recent
successes of the Commission in furthering international information-
sharing give every reason to believe that such activities will increase in
the future and prove ever more effective in combatting international
fraud.
II. CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Each day securities markets involve a multitude of transactions by a
variety of parties. Many of these transactions are interdependent, in the
sense that failure by one party to settle a transaction could undermine a
counterparty's ability to settle a second transaction, and so on, causing a
chain reaction of failures to settle. For this reason, it is crucial to the
effective functioning of a securities market that the participants have con-
fidence in one another's ability to settle transactions. Capital adequacy
standards have as their goal encouraging such confidence and helping to
ensure that a securities firm could wind down its business in an orderly
fashion without causing loss to its customers or to other participants in
the securities markets and without causi4g chaos or loss of confidence in
International Series Release No. 6 (Jan. 7, 1988), 43 SEC Docket 186 (Ontario; Quebec;
British Columbia); International Series Release No. 7 (July 1, 1988), 43 SEC Docket 206
(Brazil); International Series Release No. 112 (Sept. 26, 1989), 44 SEC Docket 1319 (It-
aly); International Series Release No. 115 (Jan 12, 1990), 45 SEC Docket 715 (Nether-
lands); International Series Release No. 117 (Jan. 12, 1990), 45 SEC Docket 726
(France); International Series Release No. 137 (Aug. 8, 1990), 46 SEC Docket 1715
(Luxembourg); International Series Release No. 181 (Oct. 22, 1990), 47 SEC Docket
1128 (Mexico); International Series Release No. 227 (Feb. 4, 1991), 48 SEC Docket 229
(France); International Series Release No. 321 (Sept. 30, 1991), 49 SEC Docket 1747
(Norway); International Series Release No. 322 (Sept. 30, 1991), 49 SEC Docket 1764
(Sweden); International Series Release No. 323 (Sept. 30, 1991), 49 SEC Docket 1767
(United Kingdom); International Series Release No. 354 (Dec. 18, 1991), 50 SEC Docket
878 (Argentina); see also International Series Release No. 320 (Sept. 30, 1991), 49 SEC
Docket 1746 (declaring intention of SEC and Commission of the European Communities
to facilitate enforcement cooperation between the SEC and the national authorities of the
European community).
25. See Exchange Act, § 21(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988).
26. See Exchange Act, § 24(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78x(d) (West Supp. 1991).




The United States has long had capital adequacy rules for securities
firms.29 In a world of globalized markets, however, the failure of a major
securities firm, whether in the United States, Great Britain, Japan, or
another nation with an internationally active securities exchange, could
have deleterious effects on markets throughout the world, causing losses
to investors around the world and impairing confidence in all of the
world's markets. For this reason, regulators around the world can no
longer afford to establish and maintain capital rules for their own coun-
tries without regard to the worldwide consequences of their actions. The
problem of capital standards in a world of globalized markets is further
complicated by the fact that internationally active banks, as well as se-
curities firms, are engaged in securities activities, although these banks
may be subject to an entirely different regulatory scheme from securities
firms.
The Commission, through the International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO"), is engaged in efforts to coordinate with bank-
ing regulators to address capital issues.3" In January 1992, the Technical
Committee of IOSCO, chaired by Chairman Breeden of the SEC, and the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, chaired by President Corrigan
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, met in Geneva. The joint
session, a subject of some public attention, considered the capital require-
ments needed to cover market risks for traded debt and equity positions
entered into by commercial banks and securities firms in major industri-
alized countries.
As a result of the Geneva meetings, IOSCO and the Basle Committee
issued a joint statement containing preliminary understandings on mini-
mum capital standards. 3 These standards would apply to all of the se-
curities positions of securities firms, but only to the trading books of
banks. One issue at the Geneva meetings was the fact that United States
securities firms maintain capital cushions under the Commission's "com-
prehensive" standard-the so-called "15% haircut" rule for equity posi-
tions. A number of other countries favored the "building block"
approach. This approach would permit lower capital cushions for long
equity positions offset by unrelated short equity positions. The Geneva
understandings recognize that regulators such as the Commission may
28. For a discussion of the need for capital adequacy standards, see The Technical
Committee of IOSCO, Report Concerning Capital Adequacy Standards for Securities
Firms 6-7 (1989).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1991) (net capital requirements for brokers and
dealers).
30. See Memorandum From IOSCO's Technical Committee to the Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, Appendix A to the Final Communique of the XVI Conference
of IOSCO (1991).
31. See Joint Statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, Technical Committee,
IOSCO, and E. Gerald Corrigan, Chairman, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(Jan. 29, 1992)(on file at SEC library).
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continue to apply a "comprehensive" standard when that results in capi-
tal requirements at least as high as or higher than the building block
approach.
Another issue faced by the regulators in Geneva concerned the defini-
tion of capital, which for securities firms generally includes a significant
component of short-term subordinated debt 32-a concept that has not
generally found favor with bank supervisors. The Geneva understand-
ings recognize a generous limit on the use of short-term subordinated
debt with a "lock-in" clause33 to meet securities firms' capital
requirements.
In each case, the Geneva understandings leave the United States and
other members free to set high, but workable, standards of capital main-
tenance for securities firms. The challenge for the future will be to avoid
employing lower capital standards as a magnet to attract securities firms
to a "gamblers' market" as nations seek to maintain or enhance their
exchange volume. On the other extreme, higher capital standards may
be employed as a trade barrier to entry. The linked securities markets of
the world thus have an enormous stake in the maintenance of appropri-
ate standards of capital adequacy.
III. DISCLOSURE
Disclosure has always been at the heart of our system of federal securi-
ties regulation. 34 The Commission has expended considerable effort to
32. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.153-1, 240.15c3-ld (1991).
33. A "lock-in" clause provides that a loan "cannot be repaid (even at maturity) if
[repayment] would bring the firm's capital below the required minimum or, in some
cases, below a threshold set at a level above the minimum." Memorandum From
IOSCO's Technical Committee to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, supra
note 30, at 4.
34. The federal securities laws have eschewed a system of "merit" regulation, where a
regulatory body would be charged with determining whether a securities offering could
proceed based on the application of substantive standards, such as fairness to investors.
A number of state securities laws have adopted a "merit" regulation approach. See 1 L.
Loss & J. Seligman, supra note 1, at 107-22. The dual federal-state regulatory system in
the United States itself raises significant issues in a world of internationalized markets.
Chairman Breeden addressed the implications of this dual system for persons considering
whether to use U.S. capital markets.
Our dual federal-state regulatory system also impedes efficient capital raising.
In stark contrast to the unified market that is likely to emerge from EC 92, the
states are erecting, rather than tearing down, roadblocks to capital raising....
Of equal concern are the 50 different sets of blue sky laws, and 50 different
corporate governance and professional licensing schemes. Practically speaking,
this means that each of the 50 states can set different standards for the sale of
securities within its borders. Unless this situation is reversed, in two years time,
it may be easier to complete a distribution of stock by an Italian company from
Portugal to Greece than for Morgan Stanley to do a comparable offering
throughout the U.S.
Richard C. Breeden, Colloquy on Globalization of Securities and Financial Market Reg-
ulation in the 1990s, Remarks Before the Administrative Conference of the United States,
Washington, D.C. 11-12 (June 14, 1990) (transcript available in SEC library).
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minimize the burdens imposed on transnational securities offerings by
differing disclosure systems.3 5 Recently, however, the Commission's dis-
closure standards have come under criticism from United States ex-
change officials seeking to list the securities of certain foreign issuers on
their exchanges.
When foreign issuers make public offerings of securities to United
35. The means have included the recognition of home-country disclosure where sys-
tems can be reconciled. In 1991, the Commission adopted regulations implementing a
multijurisdictional disclosure system to facilitate cross-border offerings of securities and
continuous reporting by certain Canadian issuers. See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (1991) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 210, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, and 269). In order
to remove unnecessary impediments to capital formation, the system permits eligible Ca-
nadian issuers to satisfy U.S. registration and reporting requirements by providing disclo-
sure documents prepared in accordance with Canadian requirements. The
multijurisdictional disclosure system also allows certain cash tender and exchange offers
for securities of Canadian issuers to be conducted in accordance with Canadian require-
ments.
The Commission is presently working with other countries, with a view toward ex-
tending the multijurisdictional system in the future. The Commission has also proposed
rules that would facilitate rights offers and exchange and tender offers with respect to
foreign securities held in limited amounts in the United States on a basis similar to the
multijurisdictional disclosure system with Canada. See 56 Fed. Reg. 27,564 (1991) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, and 240) (proposed June 4, 1991) (rights offers); 56
Fed. Reg. 27,582 (1991) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240, and 260)
(proposed June 5, 1991) (exchange and tender offers).
The Commission has taken other steps to minimize the burden on transnational securi-
ties offerings. In 1990, for example, the Commission adopted Rule 144A to provide a
non-exclusive safe harbor exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act for resales of certain restricted securities to "qualified institutional buyers." 17
C.F.R § 230.144A (1991). Rule 144A gives formal acknowledgment to the institutional
resale market for restricted securities, where the participants are professional institutional
investors who are able to make investment decisions without the protections of Securities
Act registration. See Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 53
Fed. Reg. 44,016, 44,022 (Oct. 25, 1988). The Commission has also approved a rule
change by the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), establishing the
PORTAL system. PORTAL is a screen-based marketplace for secondary trading of un-
registered securities that are exempt from Securities Act registration requirements pursu-
ant to Rule 144A. See Operation of the PORTAL Market, Exchange Act Release No.
27956, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,781 (Apr. 27, 1990).
The Commission also adopted Regulation S in 1990, to clarify the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the registration provisions of the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-
904 (1991). Regulation S does not limit the applicability of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws to a transaction that, pursuant to Regulation S, is not required
to be registered. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed.
Reg. 18,306 (Apr. 24, 1990).
Rule 144A and Regulation S were adopted, in part, as an adaptation to the global
securities markets.
[Rule 144A] may have significant implications for offerings by foreign issuers.
Foreign issuers who previously may have foregone raising capital in the United
States due to the compliance costs and liability exposure associated with regis-
tered public offerings, and the costs of financing inherent in placing restricted
securities, may find private placements in the United States a more viable capi-
tal-raising option as a result of the combined effect of proposed Rule 144A and
proposed Regulation S.
Resale of Restricted Securities, supra, at 44,022.
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States retail investors, the Commission requires that the issuers provide
the same disclosures that are required of United States issuers. This in-
cludes reconciliation to United States generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP") of the issuer's equity and net income as shown in
its financial statements prepared using the issuer's home-country ac-
counting principles. The Commission's insistence on comparable disclo-
sures by foreign and domestic issuers selling in the public retail market
reflects the conviction that such disclosure facilitates informed invest-
ment decisions. Unlike sophisticated institutional investors (covered by
Rule 144A), retail investors are not presumed capable of fending for
themselves in obtaining the information needed to make investment deci-
sions." The matter is complicated by the potential competitive risk
posed to United States issuers seeking capital in our own markets if for-
eign issuers were allowed to list on our exchanges without complying
with United States disclosure requirements.37
In recent years, there have been calls for a relaxation of United States
disclosure standards, particularly the reconciliation of equity and net in-
come to United States GAAP, in order to attract major European stocks
to seek listing on United States exchanges.3 8 Proponents of such relaxa-
tion argue that foreign issuers are deterred from United States listing by
the associated high regulatory costs and by the requirement to reconcile
their equity and net income to that which would be reported under
United States GAAP. Reconciliation has been resisted, in particular, by
German issuers. The Commission's adherence to its standards-its insis-
tence on compliance with United States regulatory requirements-is al-
leged to drive trading in foreign securities offshore, making the United
States markets less competitive. In reality, however, a large and growing
universe of foreign issuers provide the required disclosure and list upon
United States exchanges.
36. Commission testimony has described the issue this way:
Public offerings of securities by foreign companies to U.S. retail investors
present different issues [than Rule 144A]. Here the Commission has required
foreign issuers to provide the same basic disclosures made by U.S. issuers so
that U.S. investors will be able to make informed investment decisions on the
basis of comparable information. Without this protection, investors might se-
lect a foreign company's stock on the basis of higher earnings per share, for
example, only to discover later that differences in accounting or auditing stan-
dards made the foreign stock look better than that of a company using U.S.
disclosure rules.
Breeden, supra note 6, at 7.
37. See id.
38. See Power & Salwen, Big Board's Donaldson Says SEC Rules Could Cost Ex-
change Its Global Standing, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1991, at C1, col. 3; Walter & Saunders,
National and Global Competitiveness of New York City as a Financial Center, at 55-56
(New York University Salomon Center Occasional Paper No. 11, 1991); McLaughlin,
Listing Foreign Stocks on U.S. Exchanges: Time to Confront Reconciliation?, 24 Rev. Sec.
& Commodities Reg. 91 (1991); Karmel & Head, Report and Recommendations to the




On closer examination, cracks appear in proponents' arguments for
lower standards. What is presented as a global problem-the ostensible
"walling off" of United States investors and markets from a universe of
foreign stocks-appears in fact to be a problem peculiar to a clutch of
issuers who do not want to disclose the portion of currently reported
earnings attributable to the liquidation of hidden reserves, the extent to
which current earnings have been reduced by additions to those reserves,
or the extent to which equity and taxable income have been reduced
through the use of those reserves.
In the case of foreign listings, the Commission is invited to change
standards of accounting disclosure in a particularly troubling sense: if
issuers can report as current earnings amounts that are either reduced or
augmented by additions to or reductions in hidden reserves, the "man-
aged" earnings may or may not reflect actual performance for the report-
ing period. Accordingly, the Commission's staff has insisted on
disclosure to enable users of financial statements to understand the con-
tribution of reserves to reported earnings. Without such disclosure, there
would seem to be a lack of comparability, in a fundamental sense, be-
tween the financial reporting of issuers reporting under United States
GAAP and the German issuers who report their earnings with undis-
closed reserve adjustments. It will be protested that investors do, in fact,
trade in securities on the basis of non-comparable financial information.
Again, we reach the defining principle of a standard-the fact that
"other people do it" simply will not suffice if you have a duty to enforce a
standard. Here, the Commission has a very clear duty. The fact that
some purchasers do, in fact, purchase these German stocks does not jus-
tify creating an exception to United States GAAP standards, solely to
accomodate a practice that permits a "managed" earnings picture, within
the domestic securities market.
This does not mean that efforts to reduce the regulatory burden associ-
ated with the imposition by each country of its own accounting standards
are ill-conceived. Indeed, the contrary is the case. The Commission has
a keen interest in maintaining the preeminence of United States capital
markets. A strong, principled stand on the "hidden reserve" issue does
not preclude the agency from working toward acceptable international
standards. Rather, it is an appropriate basis on which to commence the
dialogue that can lead to creative and constructive solutions. The Com-
mission has been actively engaged in efforts to increase harmonization of
world accounting standards and will continue these efforts.3 9 By pro-
39. See Breeden, supra note 6, at 7-8. The Commission is working with various inter-
national bodies, including IOSCO, the International Accounting Standards Committee
("IASC"), and the International Federation of Accountants, to develop comprehensive
accounting and auditing standards. See Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Accounting and Auditing, at 11-13 (1991) (prepared for In-
ternational Institute for Securities Market Development, sponsored by SEC, Washington,
D.C.) (on file at SEC library). For a discussion of the work of IASC, see Fleming, The
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ceeding in this manner, the Commission can foster improved quality of
accounting standards throughout the world and can lend its endorsement
only to accounting standards of adequate quality and scope to facilitate
informed investment decisions.
CONCLUSION
The role of the Commission in the globalization process has largely
been that of a "standard-setter." The Commission establishes standards
to protect United States markets and United States investors. Those
standards also frequently function as standards of measurement for other
markets, even where our standards have not yet prevailed (as in trans-
parency), where others have "adjusted off" our standards (as in capital
adequacy), or where others object to our standards (as in accounting dis-
closure). In no small part, the Commission's global role derives from the
depth and breadth of our markets, which have been fostered by the Com-
mission's standards. The strength of our markets, I believe, makes the
case for retaining the standards that have contributed to that strength.
Growing Importance of International Accounting Standards, J. Acct., Sept. 1991, at 100;
IASC's Work Programme: 1992/93 Plans, IASC Insight, Dec. 1991, at 6.
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